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AbstrAct 
The effective design and delivery of micro-credits is difficult under 
all circumstances.  However, in conflict-affected societies, the task of 
microcredit institutions that seek to provide financial stability to its 
most impoverished members is more complicated. This paper aims 
to investigate the role and the impact of the microcredit industry in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Data for this study were gathered from 
both microcredit institutions and recipients of microcredit funds using 
both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The research results 
show that refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees are less 
likely to get loans compared to those with stable incomes, meaning the 
population with stable incomes has benefited more from these credits 
in improving their living conditions. Most of the targeted populations 
of the interest free microcredit foundation (MCF) that was taken as a 
case study in this research expressed their satisfactions with the loans 
and service provided by the particular MCF. From a policy perspective, 
it is important to focus attention on the most affected population 
groups, those least able to pull themselves out of poverty. Microcredit 
foundations should find a balance between being non-profit based and 
achieving their full sustainability.
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Introduction
This paper explores whether microcredit (MC) programs have any effect on allevi-
ating poverty and restoring livelihoods for the targeted populations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BH). Doyle, who conducted a comprehensive review on the general 
impact of MC in helping refugees, returnees and IDPs in improving their living 
conditions and restoring their livelihoods, seems to believe so (Doyle, 1998 & 
2008). As a mechanism that has a stated directive and the objective of targeting the 
most impoverished groups of society, the role of microfinance in BH deserves much 
more attention and serious exploration. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that endured a devastating war from 1992-
1995. The traditional best-practice paradigms of microfinance are inapplicable in 
war and conflict-affected situations because of the instability of the governmental 
and financial institutions, and the lack of communal and social trust among in-
dividuals. Within these post-war environments, refugees, returnees and internally 
displaced populations (IDPs) are among the most marginalized and helpless of the 
affected groups. Providing microfinance to them is then perhaps the most challeng-
ing problem facing practitioners and MC institutions engaged in this kind of re-
lief and development work. Various micro-financial institutions have been active in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996 and struggle with providing services in such a chal-
lenging environment. An insight into their work promises to uncover strategies that 
may be employed with the problems and successes of such endeavors. Therefore, 
this paper will shed light on the work of these organizations and their effectiveness.
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The following relevant research questions are addressed in this study:
Research question number one: How do micro-credits affect the livelihoods of the tar-
geted groups, and to what extent do refugees, internally displaced persons and 
returnees have access to micro-credits in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Research question number two: What are the objectives of the microcredit programs, 
and what are the most requested loans in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
Research question number three: What are the perspectives of the beneficiaries of 
micro-credits in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding this service and its impact 
on them?
There is a big debate and doubts about the certain impact of the MC industry in 
BH both at the local and international levels. The reports from the World Bank, 
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) and the Association of Microfinance 
Institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (AMFI) show that; among peers in Kosovo 
and in the Balkans (Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia) in general, 
as well as peers similar in size and market outreach from Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA), the Bosnian MFIs are some of the most highly leveraged, more than 
70 percent of all funding to MFIs in BH during 2007 came from foreign lenders. 
In 2007, most Bosnian MFIs showed high growth rates in active borrowers and 
especially loan portfolio. More than half of the non-bank MFIs grew by more than 
50 percent in outreach. On the other hand, others like Karnani (2007a) suggested 
that governments, businesses and civil society should work together to reallocate 
their resources away from microfinance and instead support larger enterprises in 
labour intensive industries. A strong critique comes from Bateman (2007a) ‘new 
wave commercial microfinance’ where he asks whether microfinance can actually 
undermine medium-term economic development because it supports inefficient ac-
tivities. Bateman found that there is little solid evidence to confirm that commercial 
microfinance facilitates sustain economic and social development.
However, this paper might provide some evidence as to whether the MCI in BH, 
with it’s both commercial and non-profit institutions, helps in alleviating poverty 
and promots economic and social development.
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Literature Review
Origin and Philosophy of Microcredit
Micro-credits, as a viable tool of development, began in 1976 when Bangladeshi 
economist and social reformer Muhammad Yunus began lending small amounts of 
money to rural poor women of Jobra village to start or expand their businesses. That 
initial and modest foray into microcredit eventually culminated in the formal estab-
lishment in 1983 of the Grameen Bank based on principles of group-based lending 
of small-sized loans with zero collateral. (Yunus,  2004)
Focusing specifically on the agency, entrepreneurial skills and innovation of the 
marginalized and poverty-stricken populations in developing countries, the “greatest 
triumph of microfinance was the demonstration that poor households could be reliable 
bank customers” (Cull, 2008).  Moreover, Yunus utilized microfinance to directly 
mitigate a significant and core problem in development economics: that the poor 
remain poor because they do not have access to productive capital to grow their way 
out of poverty (Kanishka, 2009).
Historically, microfinance programs have been developed and targeted to address 
the concerns and needs of poor households that markets and governments fail to 
adequately confront. More specifically, according to Heen (2004), the client-base 
of microfinance institutions includes: female heads of households, pensioners, dis-
placed persons, retrenched workers, small farmers, and micro-entrepreneurs, each 
of whom fall into one of four poverty levels: destitute, extreme poor, moderate poor, 
and vulnerable non-poor. These programs typically offer a wide range of financial 
services such as: deposits, loans, savings, payment services, money transfers, and 
insurance to the poor and low-income households and their micro-enterprises who 
are excluded from the formal financial systems (Swain, Ranjula, Nguyen, & Vo 
Tuan, 2008). According to Legerwood (1999), microfinance institutions may also 
provide social intermediation services such as: group formation, development of self 
confidence, and training in financial literacy and management capabilities among 
members of a group. Thus, microfinance is more than simple banking; it is a devel-
opment tool as she asserts (Legerwood, 1999, p. 1). In BH a Center for Financial 
and Credit Counseling (known by its Bosnian acronym CFKS) opened its doors in 
Tuzla in 2010 and aims to offer debt mediation and financial education to borrow-
ers. 
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The most successful of the microfinance development philosophy is evidenced by re-
ports of the top micro lenders which boast repayment rates of 98 percent or higher, 
all achieved without securing any collateral for the loans. This success is attributed, 
by Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, & Morduch (2008), to “new lending practices, especially 
“group lending” (also called “joint liability” lending). Authors described this model in 
which customers were typically formed into small groups and required to guarantee 
each others’ loan repayments, aligning their incentives with those of the bank. This 
practice was rarely used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, due to lack of the trust between 
groups and society as a direct consequence of the recent war.  
Rhyne (2001) best summarizes the common philosophies and goals driving the 
current microfinance movement as follows: using the client’s character rather than 
collateral as the primary loan security, streamlining the administrative processes to 
lower costs, responding rapidly to late payments, providing positive incentives for 
repayment, charging interest rates that approach or cover costs, and emphasizing the 
long-term sustainability of the lending organization (Rhyne, 2001, p. 7).
However, this is not to say that microfinance has been credited as an unprecedented 
success. Microfinance programs are also weakened by a serious and well-acknowl-
edged lack of comprehensive and tough impact evaluations. Morduch (1998) ex-
plained this very fact in his book The Microfinance Promise. In his summary of the 
problems confronting the microfinance industry he argued that the promise of mi-
crofinance was founded on innovation: new management structures, new contracts, 
and new attitudes. The leading programs came about by trial and error. Once the 
mechanisms worked reasonably well, standardization and replication became top 
priorities, with continued innovation only around the edges. As a result, most pro-
grams are not optimally designed nor necessarily offering the most desirable finan-
cial products. Such weaknesses and difficulties facing the MC industry in BH are 
easily noticed since 2009 till today. Many critics, articles and analysis have been 
published locally and overseas tackling issues like: indebtedness of MC clients, high 
profit generated by MCFs, lack in pricing transparency regarding interest rates, sky-
rocketing salaries and privileges of MCF managers. The harshest criticism came 
from Milford Bateman during a round table conference in September 2011 when 
he concluded that the MC industry in BH is a failed experiment.
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Microfinance in Post-War/Conflict Environments
The fundamental point according to Doyle (1998, 2008) is that of microfinance 
being viewed as a tool that can serve multiple goals. Predominantly, it remains an 
economic development strategy that focuses on rebuilding and restarting local econ-
omies by providing needed financial services for enterprise creation, but there is also 
consideration of its use as a relief and survival strategy in the immediate wake of 
disaster, and as a tool for peace and reconciliation.
At the same time, Heen (2004) believes that just because microfinance programs 
focus on marginalized groups in a given society does not mean that microfinance 
automatically avoids the broader problems and risks of development and that mi-
crofinance products and programs may, in fact, create conflicts in a number of ways. 
According to her, microfinance programs may cause conflicts in two ways; first, by 
reinforcing or creating new social divisions through client or geographical targeting, 
and second, by causing conflicts among clients especially if group lending mecha-
nisms are used and one member of the group is unable to repay, and the whole 
group suffers as a consequence (Heen, 2004, p. 12-13).
Uvin (1999) argues that a purely economic-technical approach to development may 
help to lay the groundwork for further inequality and mal-development, as well as 
structural, and eventually acute, violence. This point is only further underscored by 
Doyle (2008) when she writes that microfinance professionals in conflict-affected 
environments must understand the dual imperative of being proactive as well as 
careful. While, doing nothing or retreating could result in prolonged human suf-
fering and the need for more extensive, costly, and difficult involvement down the 
road, acting hastily or unwisely could create unintended, potentially severe repercus-
sions (Doyle, 2008, p. 1). Most of the above mentioned unfavorable consequences 
could occur in BH as well. 
Essential and Preferred Conditions of Microfinance in Post-Conflict Areas 
Keeping the primacy of good preparation in mind, Doyle lists several essential con-
ditions that must be in place to institute microfinancial activities in a conflict-affect-
ed area. She then goes on to list several preferred conditions which while not entirely 
necessary, are still entirely desirable (Doyle, 2008, p. 7-11).
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Essential Conditions include: low intensity of conflict, reopening of markets and 
long-term displacement (18 months or longer). In the case of BH the long term re-
patriation process is one of the biggest concerns for both politicians and individuals, 
so this could be considered an important condition to be taken into consideration 
by the MC industry. 
Preferred Conditions include; relatively dense population, enabling legislation for 
microfinance (MF) institutions, a skilled and educated workforce, social capital, 
and trust in the local currency and financial institutions. In the case of BH the 
legislations for MF started late in 2006 and were officially applied in 2008. This 
delay could be one of the root causes of current problems that both clients and MC 
industry have been facing since 2009.
However, keeping in mind the obstacles, and the critical need to be careful as well 
as proactive, Doyle notes several steps to be undertaken before embarking on mi-
crofinance refugee programs. These include; first, investigating the current political 
situation to learn whether refugees are likely to be repatriated within the next 12 
months. Second, ensuring that there are activities that can gradually integrate refu-
gees into the local markets and in a nonthreatening way. Third, asking refugees what 
sort of financial services or non-financial services they need most now, then building 
a program around the existing situation. Fourth, instilling confidence in the perma-
nence of the microfinance services as long as refugees are in their current location to 
ensure repayment, and implement the program with a longer-term vision.
Microfinance for Refugees, Internally Displaced and Returnees
Even before counting the challenges that would be inevitable to the implementation 
of a microfinance program for refugees, returnees and internally displaced popula-
tions, it is valuable to discuss some more general constraints on the economic lives 
of these groups. Jacobsen (2005), writes in her book that the abilities of refugees 
and internally displaced persons in camps to engage in viable economic activities 
that go beyond subsistence is determined by their access to productive assets such as 
arable land, economic infrastructure such as mills and storage facilities and perhaps 
most importantly, credit. Jacobsen goes onto list several factors which restrict access 
to these productive assets, one of which being freedom of movement in and out of 
camps in order to pursue these economic activities. Moreover, she writes, “refugees in 
protracted situations must also cope with shifts in attitude from the host community, 
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which can affect both the willingness of authorities to implement restrictions, and 
refugees’ economic activities” (Jacobsen, 2005, p. 31). This is very true in the case 
of returnees in BH, as the unwillingness of the dominant majorities and restrictions 
created by authorities are some of the biggest obstacles facing MCFs in targeting this 
vulnerable group of the population.    
In light of the above, in the world of post-conflict reconstruction and develop-
ment evaluating, designing and implementing a microfinance program for refu-
gees, returnees and internally displaced populations presents an additional layer of 
difficulty and complexity. Bartsch (2005) outlines some of these difficulties. First, 
microfinance is oftentimes founded on the notion of group solidarity to replace the 
conventional banking requirement of material or monetary collateral. It is exactly 
this group solidarity which is most absent from refugee populations. Second, mi-
crofinance as an industry is more closely related to the principles of banking than to 
relief and will need to seriously review and also perhaps check its measures of suc-
cess. Third, while the provision of relief is supposed to benefit the poorest and most 
affected populations, microfinance in its current form, is bound to benefit only peo-
ple already endowed with business acumen and, often enough, sufficient resources 
to sustain themselves. Fourth, to be successful microfinance must be implemented 
as one strategy amoung an entire array of relief and development strategies such as 
business training and, most importantly, an enabling environment. 
In post-war countries like BH assuring a smooth approach from relief to develop-
ment strategies in MC is very crucial in order to avoid or minimize the consequenc-
es of immediate shifting or jumping from the relief and emergency phase to the 
development phase without considering or going through the rehabilitation phase. 
The MC industry should apply and adopt a rehabilitation strategy before moving 
further in the development phase, and this could be considered one of the main root 
causes of the current crisis facing the industry since 2009. 
Debt Capacity and Repayment Suspension
One of the reasons for the popularity of micro-credits is the performance on loan re-
covery where anything below 95 percent is considered unsatisfactory by donor organi-
zations (Harper, 2007a, p. 39). However, loan recovery does not give any indication of 
whether people are able to pay back the loans without suffering additional destitution, 
something that has become much clearer during the current global economic crisis 
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which has affected the debt recovery of large number of borrowers in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. In other words, debt recovery relies heavily on the debt capacity of the bor-
rowers which was defined by Von Pischke (1991, p. 177) as follows; lenders are able 
to recover loans on schedule only when the repayment capacity of the borrower equals 
or exceeds debt services which consist of principal and interest due for payment. Bor-
rowers are able to repay their loans on time without suffering hardship only when 
their repayment capacity equals or exceeds the debt service due according to the loan 
contract. In order to be consistent with the Microcredit Foundations (MCFs) aim to 
serve as a catalyst for economic development, the repayment capacity should exceed 
the debt service by a considerable margin. However, according to the available data on 
most of MCFs’ websites and reports in BH, this is commonly not the case. And early 
warning signals sent by a few local practitioners as a result of their internal surveys and 
observations were not taken seriously nor could they prevent the sudden explosion of 
the current crisis that the industry is facing since 2009. 
In spite of this, the lack of debt capacity, repayment suspension is granted only in very 
exceptional circumstances as Rutherford (2002) stated. As Mareen (2008, p. 402) 
state: “Even during major disasters, such as the 1998 and 2004 floods in Bangladesh, pay-
ments were at best postponed until flood waters had receded”. While in Bosnia and Herze-
govina since the 2009 global economic crises, the loans reconstructing (rescheduling) 
technique was used to overcome the delay on repayments, such approach guaranteed 
borrowers longer periods but loaded them with extra interest charges.
MCFs Organizational Structures and Loan Recycling
Organizational Structure; According to Wood and Sharif (1997), and Hulme and 
Moseley (1996), in many MCFs the “discretionary power” to grant a stay of pay-
ment does not rest with the fieldworker or the branch manager but rather with man-
agers higher up in the hierarchy. This is important as hierarchical decision making 
and operational autonomy notably affects the ability of borrowers to cope with and 
recover from emergencies both in positive and negative terms. The same could be 
said for the MCF that will be used as a case study in this paper as well as all other 
MCFs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Loan Recycling; According to Yunus (2002); “once half the outstanding loan is re-
paid, clients are allowed to take out a second loan to help pay off the previous loan”. 
Loan recycling has become a common practice in many MCFs in Bosnia and Her-
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zegovina, as this has been approved by the Federal Banking Agency (FBA) which 
controls the activities of all MCFs since June 2008. But in the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the practice of loan recycling has been applied regardless of the above 
condition mentioned by Yunus. MCFs varied in initiating conditions to secure get-
ting back their money from borrowers; some of them asked borrowers to only have 
guarantors who are working in governmental sectors, while others asked for addi-
tional interest or offered larger loans and longer repayment periods with conditions 
to close the whole amount of the previous loan immediately. 
Alleviating Poverty and Pricing Transparency 
The extra liquidity was intended for daily expenses during the crisis, as well as for 
productive investment. However, handing out more money on credit should never 
be a solution in itself as over time it can change attitudes and erode cautiousness 
according to Nagarajan (1998), Dichter (2007) and Allen (2007). Microcredit is 
generally most appropriate where ongoing economic activity and sufficient house-
hold cash flow already exist as explained by (CGAP, 2005, p. 8). In spite of MCFs 
having long been highly transparent in some areas, due to the complications of mar-
ket conditions and lack of regulation, the true price of loan products has never been 
accurately measured or reported. This is a serious weakness in the industry, although 
there has been a serious effort made since 2008 regarding the transparent pricing 
issue, even though this still listed prominently in all consumer protection efforts 
currently underway.  Elizabeth Littlefield (2009), the former CEO of CGAP, stated: 
“MF Transparency aims at giving microfinance institutions information to offer better 
value to customers. And it will give investors and others the information they need to put 
pressure on those institutions that may be charging unreasonably high fees or hiding the 
full cost of their services. We applaud the effort.”
Social and Economic Stagnation in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The social and economic situation of many people living in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is difficult, particularly for the IDPs and returnees. Many IDPs still live in collective 
accommodation, while the returnees are suffering from an extremely high unemploy-
ment rate in majority dominated areas, the loss of a social assurance system, poor 
health care, education and infrastructure facilities. Furthermore many families lost 
their main breadwinner and are therefore being confronted with poverty that they did 
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not know before the war. Bosnia and Herzegovina has not yet managed to overcome 
economic stagnation. The market is still split because of a federal fragmentation and 
non-standardized regulations; there is no uniform economic, tax or legal policy. The 
transformation from a socialist to capitalist economy has exacerbated the social situ-
ation, which is already precarious in the aftermath of the war. Fifteen years after the 
war, many young people are leaving the country to search for work and better living 
conditions as they can no longer see their future in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Table 1 and table 2 show general statistics on Bosnia and Herzegovina that reflects 
the multi-ethnic composition of the country, and how much it is crucial for those 
who offer such services to be very sensitive and careful in regards to neutrality and 
impartiality. It is also crucial to target the host community in addition to returnees, 
refugees and IDPs. In order for the host community not to feel disadvantaged by the 
presence of these vulnerable groups, and in order not to obstruct the services that are 
offered to them, it is very crucial that the host community, in one way or another, 
gets benefits from the same services that the other target groups are enjoying. The 
table also shows that almost more than one million IDPs and refugees have been 
resettled in their prewar houses, something which is very important to remember 
when comparing this (in the next sections of this study) to the accessibility of these 
groups to micro-credits.
Table 1. General statistics on BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA according to 1991 
census
Indicators FBH RS BD Total
Surface area in km2 / %      26.110,5 (%51) 24.605,7 (%48,0) 493  (%1,0) 51.209,2
% of population by territory %62,1 %35,9 %2,0 %100
Source: Statistics on BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (ISSN 1512-5106)
Table 2. General statistics on BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA according to 1991 
census














Returnees from1996-2006 630.730 129.612 249.020 - 8.071 1.017.43
Source: Statistics on BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA (ISSN 1512-5106)
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Table 3 shows different human development indicators taken from the UNDP 2009 
annual report, which reflects the need for more efforts to improve the quality peo-
ples’ lives. Around 20% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina are definitely 
poor or on the edge of poverty, while Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked 76th out of 
177 countries in human development index. The encouraging figures coming from 
life expectancy where Bosnia and Herzegovina is ranked 51st and in adult literacy is 
ranked 39th with rate of 96.7%.
Table 3. Human Development Indicators of BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
76. (out of 182) / %81,2Human Development Index “HDI” (rank/rate),
51./ 75,1 yearsLife expectancy at birth (rank/year)
18Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)
39. / %96,7Adult literacy for ages 15 and above (rank/rate)
27. / %1People not using an improved water source (rank/rate)
92. / 7,764GDP per capita (rank/PPP US$)
%11,3, %7,8, %73,9
% of Poverty level - definitely poor,  
on the edge of poverty, not definitely poor
88. 86. 106 (%25, %25, %18,6)
Population below poverty line during  
2009, 2010, 2011( rank/rate) 
Conflict Background and History
The signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in December 1995 ended the 
conflict and established Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federal state made up of two 
entities: the (mainly Bosnian Serb) Republic of Srpska (RS) and the (mainly Bos-
niak and Croat) Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBH). According to the 
DPA each entity has its own government, president, parliament and police, and un-
til 2005, each had its own army. The north-eastern Brčko district (BD) is a self-gov-
erning administrative unit with territory in both (FBH) and (RS). In the aftermath 
of the war, the international community set out to establish a peaceful, multi-ethnic 
state by: stabilizing the country militarily, promoting the return of displaced people 
and by reforming national institutions. The DPA provided for a strong internation-
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al presence including a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led military 
force, and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to oversee the civil im-
plementation of the DPA. Specific to refugees and internally displaced people, the 
DPA focused on the right of the displaced to return to their homes and reclaim their 
properties. As of June 2008, the number of internally displaced persons estimated 
by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Ministry 
of Human Rights and Refugees (MHRR) had dropped from 1,200,000 to around 
125,000 (UNHCR, June 2008 citing government figures), indicating that over one 
million refugees and IDPs had returned to their pre-war residences.
Research Methodology
The research methodology of this paper considered a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods and identified the use of content analysis and question-
naires as the most appropriate. The primary data mostly from the questionnaires is 
complemented by secondary data from the reports of various institutions in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
The primary was data collected in March 2010 by an interest-free MCF in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina that was chosen as a case study in this paper and kept anonymous upon 
the request of the organization. In one questionnaire, 458 borrowers expressed their 
perspectives about the impact of microcredit on their lives, while 50 borrowers in an-
other questionnaire expressed their perspectives about interest-free and interest-based 
loans. The surveys covered 40 towns within five Cantons in the FBH, RS and BD. 
The breakdown of these towns according to identities and Cantons is given in Table 4. 
Table 4. Survey Region and Towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Regions Towns
Central Bosnia Canton Vitiz, Travnik, Novi Travnik, Gornji Vakuf, Donji Vakuf Fojnica
Tuzla Canton Tuzla, Gradacac, Srebernik, Sapna, Teocak, Ugljevik, Zevinica, Teslic, Kalesija, Celic, 
Gracanica, Lukavac, Banovic
Zenica-Doboj Canton Doboj-Istok, Tesanj, Kakanj, Zenica, Vares, Visoko, Zavidovic, Zepce
Podrinje Canton: Gorazde, Ustikolina
Brcko District: Brcko
Republic of Srpska: Bijelina, Milici, Zvornic, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Voca, Visegrad, Zepa.                                                                
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The primary data also includes: five one-to-one interviews with senior managers of 
MCFs and a number of borrowers, many field visits and meetings with loan officers 
and the general population, and observations on the microcredit industry in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina over the past five years.                                  
Secondary data includes the data and reports of the Association of Microfinance 
Institutions (AMFI) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, statistics from the “Bureau of Sta-
tistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, websites of MCFs in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and the 2009 annual report of  the MCF that has been taken as 
a case study.
Analysis of Results
This analysis aims to outline what has been compiled from data and information 
related to the three questions that this paper is addressing. The findings below in 
table 5 are related to the first research question and show that only 3% of employ-
ment has been created, 89% of borrowers were willing to get another loan,  96% 
solved their problems through getting loans, while 41% of them have problems in 
making their repayments.
Table 5. Borrowers perspectives about the impact of MICROCREDIT on their lives 
Items Yes (Number/%) No (Number/%)
Solved problem with loan 441/ 96% 17 / 4%
Improved life standard 443 / 97% 15 / 3%
Created new employment 15 / 3% 443 / 97%
Have problems with repayment 186 / 41% 272 / 59%
Willing to get another loan 406 / 89% 52 / 11%
Total number of questionnaires 458
The Impact of Microcredit Programs in Alleviating Poverty and Restoring Livelihoods of the Targeted 
Populations in Bosnia And Herzegovina
83Volume 2        Number 1        Spring 2012
The findings in the table below (Table 6) related to the second part of the first 
research question show that only 3% of returnees and 2% of IDPs  have access to 
microcredit, despite the fact that more than one million refugees and IDPs have 
managed to return and settle to their pre-war houses. 
Table 6. The accessibility of returnees, refugees, and IDPs to microcredit in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
% of loans disbursed to IDPs % of loans disbursed to returnees % of loans disbursed to refugees
2% 3% No evidence
The results of both primary and secondary data show that overall objective of micro-
credit organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina is alleviating poverty by improving 
the livelihoods of the poorest people. Microcredit organizations state that the fol-
lowing are objectively verifiable indicators of achievements: increase in the income 
of borrowers; improvements in the standards of living; improvements in housing 
standards; improvements in family health; improvements in the overall quality of 
life and improvements in the quality of education.
Research results further state that the main purpose of microcredit programs in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina is to empower and assist returnees and IDPs to return to their 
pre-war houses. Other objectives include reconstructing destroyed houses, starting 
small businesses, assisting socially disadvantaged persons, improving the living con-
ditions of the poor and assisting poor students to afford a good education.
Microcredit organizations use a number of indicators to measure their achievements. 
These include: the number of businesses started and expanded through microcredit 
programs, the sustainability and profit level of these businesses, the decline in the 
poverty level of beneficiaries, the number of people moving into proper houses, the 
number of returnees settled in their pre-war houses, the number of returnees em-
ployed, the number of jobs created, and the number of children that continue their 
education in communities.
The findings in Table 7 are related to the second part of research question number 
two, showing that the following percentages of types of loans have been disbursed: 
32% housing loans; provided to help rebuilding and renovating destroyed homes; 
37% business loans, helping in establishing of small businesses; 5% orphans loans, 
given to families carrying for an orphan; 18% social loans, provided in most cases to 
socially endangered population and 8% educational loans, provided to students in 
order to assist them to continue their education. 
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Table 7. Percentage of the type of loans disbursed in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Business loans Housing loans Social loans Educational loans Orphans loans 
37% 32% 18% 8% 5%
In regards to the interest issue, the findings from the secondary data show that there 
are two kinds of loans; 
Interest-Based and Interest-Free Loans: There are 25 MCFs in BH, from which 
13 are members of the Association of Microfinance Institutions in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (AMFI). Only one of them is interest-free and the others are interest-based. 
Interest-Based Loan: Most of the interest based MCFs began their activities in 
1996. According to the 2010 first quarterly report of the AMFI these MCFs have 
a portfolio of around 825 million BAM, around 325.000 active loans, a gained 
amount of 95.535.126 BAM net profit in 2009, while their annual interest rates 
differ from 15% up to 36%. 
Interest-Free Loans: The interest-free MCFs began their activities in 2001. Accord-
ing to their annual report in 2009 they have portfolio in the amount of around three 
million BAM, less than 1800 active loans, gained no profit but did have losses, and 
charged up to 7.5% as admin fees for their services.
Finally, the findings from Table 8 show that 88% of borrowers expressed their readi-
ness to seek loans from interest-free MCFs even if they are more expensive than 
interest-based ones. When answering the question “Why did you seek a loan from 
an interest-free MCF rather than any other MCFs?” 52% said that it was due to its 
compliance with Shariah, while 48% said it was due to cheaper cost.








1. Were there any other loans available to you when 
you received the loan from the interest-free MCF? 45 (90%) 1 (2%) 4 no answer (8%)
2. Why did you seek a loan from interest-free rather 
than any other MCFs? - -
26 Compliance with 
shariah (52%)
24 Low admin costs (48%)
3. Would you seek loans from interest-free MCF even  
if it is more expensive than interest-based loans? 
44(88%) 6 (12%)
4. Do you feel there is an extra obligation to repay 
because Interest-free is in compliance with Shariah?
34 (68%)
14(28%)
2 no answer (4%)
Total number of questionnaires 50
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Discussion
This section of the paper discusses the overall findings of this study, and determines 
the answer to each of the three research questions. In regards to the first question 
(How does microcredit affect the livelihoods of the targeted groups, and to what 
extent do refugees, internally displaced persons and returnees have access to micro-
credits in Bosnia and Herzegovina?) the findings are very modest: only 3% of jobs 
have been created, the reason could be better understood if one realizes that only 
37% of loans were taken for creating or developing businesses, this means that most 
of the taken business loans were used for self employment and improving the living 
conditions of borrowers, but not for expanding businesses and creating new jobs.
The findings also show that only 3% of returnees and only 2% of IDPs had access to 
MC, although more than one million of refugees and IDPs have managed to return 
and settle. Obviously, it could be understood that this vulnerable group has benefited 
the least from MC programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Regarding the second ques-
tion (What are the objectives of the microcredit programs, and what are the most 
requested loans in Bosnia and Herzegovina?) the findings from the case study carried 
by one  MCFs (interest-free) operating in more than 64 municipalities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina during 2009, concluded that only 37% of the disbursed loans were used 
in a productive manner (business loans), such as livestock/poultry rearing, trading and 
farming, agriculture, handicrafts, etc, while 32% have been used for renovating and 
reconstructing houses (housing loans), 18% have been used to cover social needs such 
as food, medication, etc (social loans), 8% have been used for educational purposes, 
such as paying university fees, buying books, computers, etc, (educational loans), and 
5% have been used to support families caring for orphans (orphans loans). This shows 
that despite the fact that 15 years have passed since the war ended in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, there is still a need for reconstruction and renovation of devastated houses.
The findings also show that enough funds, from different donors and investors in-
cluding the World Bank, are available for the interest-based MCFs, as they have 
portfolios of around 825 million BAM and around 325.000 BAM in active loans. 
While the interest-free ones have limited funds with a portfolio of around 3 million 
BAM, as they have no access to banks and international funds and investors due to 
Shariah restrictions that forbid taking or giving interest under any circumstances. 
On the other hand, the interest-free MCFs seem to have two advantages; the first 
one is that they are much cheaper than other MCFs, and the second advantage is the 
willingness of the majority of the target population, who are Muslims, to comply 
with Shariah in regards to the issue of the interest. 
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In relation to the third question (What are the perspectives of the beneficiaries of mi-
cro-credits in Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding this service and its impact on them?) 
the findings from the previously mentioned case study reflect the need of MCFs to 
continue operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as more than 95% expressed that 
MCs solved their problems and improved their living standards. On the other hand, 
by analyzing the figures of at risk portfolios (9,7%) and write offs loans (9,8%), and 
the 41% of borrowers who expressed having problems with their repayments, it seems 
that MCFs, in one way or another, had encouraged borrowers to get more loans, thus 
burdening them with more debts. Another meaningful finding from the same case 
study is that even though 41% of borrowers have problems with repayment, 89% 
expressed their willingness to get more loans, something that has a positive side and 
a negative side. The positive side reflects the feeling of people that, with the passing 
of time, they can rely on getting more loans to develop their business and solve their 
financial problems, while the negative side is that they might become overloaded with 
loans and find themselves sinking deeper and deeper into poverty.
Conclusion
As a conclusion, the findings reflect the meaningful objectives that were set out by 
MCFs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the direct impact of MC on the population’s 
life, as most of them expressed their satisfaction with getting loans as a solution to their 
daily problems. In practice, it seems that MC in Bosnia and Herzegovina has contrib-
uted mostly by helping people who have regular income to cover their loans, more 
than helping those without stable income. The findings also suggest that despite the 
long existence and wide availability of micro-credits in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many 
people do not generate enough income to become self-sufficient, and the number of 
jobs created is very modest. The statement of a senior manager in one MCF is insight-
ful in this respect: “Even though microfinance may meet the varied and immediate 
needs of many people, meeting those needs does not mean that microfinance is lifting 
them out of poverty”. Therefore many clients often fail to break out of income poverty 
and many even get caught up in an increasing debt-burden syndrome and slide further 
into poverty. While interviewing a number of borrowers, many of them stated that 
they had been encouraged and facilitated to get many loans from same MCF; one of 
them admitted that he/she got more than 20 active loans from only one MCF.
The demographic of returnees, refugees, and IDPs have the least access to MC, 
and those who do have access are those who have the greatest difficulties with their 
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repayments. This emphasizes that these categories should be much more targeted, 
with much better facilities, which current MCFs in Bosnia and Herzegovina may 
not be able to offer. Most of MCFs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are interest-based 
and have qualified human resources and adequate financial resources as well, some-
thing that led some of them to consider transitioning to banking institutions. Also, 
some of them have won international awards, confirming that it is possible for MC 
in Bosnia to record its contribution to the development of this industry at the inter-
national level. In contrast, there are very few interest-free MCFs, with very limited 
human and financial resources. However, this study has shown that these types of 
institutions have the acceptance of a large segment of the Bosnian Muslim society, 
as the findings affirm the willingness of the target population to adhere to Islamic 
rules related to the interest issue. But in order for these kinds of institutions to at-
tract more donors and investors and to deliver a better service, they should: allocate 
much more funds, advocate on behalf of the poorest population and initiate new 
techniques to reach and target them, end suspicions as whether charging adminis-
tration fees on a percentage basis is compliant with Shariah or not, have a qualified 
shariah board, or shariah consultant to supervise and give directions to the work in 
the field, and adopt new techniques “even if they are not fully lawful by shariah” to 
secure their funds and to avoid the delay issue in repayments. It is wise to remember 
and adopt the Shariah principle that rules: Choosing the lesser of two evils.
The findings also show that the MC industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina seems to not 
be cheap enough, as the interest rates in most of MCFs are pretty high and might not 
be transparent enough; while advertizing relatively lower rates, extra expenses will be 
paid by the client in many other forms, such as: application fees, loan monitoring, etc. 
During one-to-one interviews and discussions with several senior managers of MCFs, 
one of them admitted that the annual interest rate comes up to 36%. Another senior 
manager explained the success of his/her organization, where the annual net profit ex-
ceeded one million Euros. The findings also reflect that despite the fact that more than 
15 years have passed since the war ended, there is still a need for the reconstruction and 
renovation of devastated houses, as large scale of loans have been taken for this purpose. 
Finally, the limitation of this paper is that it mostly reflects the perceptions of the 
clients of only one interest free MCF which was taken as a case study in this re-
search. This confirms the need for more comprehensive future studies on the MC 
industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina; particularly the interest based ones, in order to 
explore the real impact of these institutions on the local economy and peoples’ lives, 
and to serve as a guide and reference for the industry. 
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